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Abstract—The recent advances in sensor technologies and
smart devices enable the collaborative collection of a sheer volume
of data from multiple information sources. As a promising tool to
efficiently extract useful information from such big data, machine
learning has been pushed to the forefront and seen great success
in a wide range of relevant areas such as computer vision, health
care, and financial market analysis. To accommodate the large
volume of data, there is a surge of interest in the design of
distributed machine learning, among which stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) is one of the mostly adopted methods. Nonetheless,
distributed machine learning methods may be vulnerable to
Byzantine attack, in which the adversary can deliberately share
falsified information to disrupt the intended machine learning
procedures. In this work, two asynchronous Byzantine tolerant
SGD algorithms are proposed, in which the honest collaborative
workers are assumed to store the model parameters derived
from their own local data and use them as the ground truth.
The proposed algorithms can deal with an arbitrary number
of Byzantine attackers and are provably convergent. Simulation
results based on a real-world dataset are presented to verify
the theoretical results and demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of sensors and smart devices, the past
decade has witnessed the blowout growth in the size of the
daily generated data. For example, according to [1], the world
produces around 2.5 quintillion bytes of data per day in
2014. Also, as predicted by Cisco, there will be around 11.6
billion mobile devices by the year 2020 and a smartphone will
generate 4.4 gigabytes data per month on average [2]. Facing
such a data deluge, distributed machine learning is anticipated
to play an essential role because of its ability to exploit
the collective computation power of the local smart/sensing
devices, thereby leading to enhanced big data analytics [3].
Specifically, distributed machine learning mechanisms have
several advantages over its centralized counterpart in big
data related applications. Firstly, decentralization offers better
scalability, and thus facilitates large-scale machine learning
applications in practice. Secondly, it eliminates the burden-
some process of moving the large amount of data from the
distributed devices to a central unit [4] as well as the difficulty
of storing the excessive amount of data in a single machine
[5].
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In the existing literature of distributed machine learning,
the workers are usually assumed to be honest and perform
perfectly well (i.e., not making any mistake in calculation
and information transmission). However, in practice, some
of the workers may share wrong information due to system
malfunction or software bugs. Also, some of them may even be
compromised by an adversary and deliberately share falsified
information to mislead the other co-workers. As is shown in [6]
and [7], even a single Byzantine worker can severely disrupt
the convergence of distributed gradient descent algorithms.
This problem becomes more critical in big data applications,
since the large number of data collection devices (i.e., the
workers in machine learning applications) and the sheer vol-
ume of the collected data make it extremely challenging, if not
impossible, to ensure perfect trustworthiness in data sharing
and processing.
There have been some recent works [6]–[12] on Byzantine
tolerant distributed machine learning algorithms, and most of
them focus on stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which is
one of the classic and widely adopted distributed machine
learning algorithm with good scalability. However, most of
them only consider the synchronous setting. This may lead
to a waste of computation resources, since the workers with
better computation capability have to wait for the other slower
workers. In addition, most existing methods can deal with
only a limited number of Byzantine workers. Moreover, they
all assume a parameter server to coordinate the collaboration
among the workers, which may be vulnerable to the single
point of failure (SPOF).
To better accommodate the need of big data analytics, two
asynchronous distributed Byzantine tolerant SGD algorithms
that can deal with an arbitrary number of Byzantine workers
are proposed in this work. Particularly, in the proposed algo-
rithms, the workers are allowed to maintain their own local
model parameters, which eliminates the need for a shared
parameter server as in the existing literature. Also, in this
setting, the workers do not need to wait for the latest broadcast
model parameter from the parameter server and can proactively
fetch the current learning results from the other (possibly
Byzantine) co-workers at any time, thereby fulfilling asyn-
chronous learning.1 The two proposed algorithms correspond
to two different scenarios, respectively. In the first scenario, it
is assumed that an upper-bound p of the number of Byzantine
workers is known. To defend the Byzantine attack in this case,
each worker takes an average of the N − p model parameters
that are closest to its own and then performs a gradient descent
update step based on this average value. In the second scenario,
no prior knowledge about the number of Byzantine workers
is assumed. In this case, each worker first accepts the model
parameters that potentially lead to lower empirical risk based
on its evaluation over the local training samples. Then, the
worker takes an average over the accepted model parameters
and performs a gradient descent update step accordingly. Both
of the proposed algorithms are provably convergent.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Section II reviews preliminaries and notations used in this
work. The problem is formulated and presented in Section III.
The proposed algorithms are presented in Section IV. The
effectiveness of the proposed algorithms is examined through
simulations in Section V. Related works are discussed in
Section VI. Conclusions and future works are presented in
Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this section, we start by reviewing some important def-
initions. Suppose that there is a training data set S =
{(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} with n training instances randomly
sampled from a sample space Z = X × Y , where X is a
space of feature vectors and Y is a label space. Let W ⊆ Rd
be a hypothesis space of the model parameter equipped with
the standard inner product and 2-norm ||·||. Given a prediction
model h(w) ∈ F : X → Y which is parameterized by w ∈ W ,
the goal is to learn a good model parameter w. The prediction
accuracy is measured by a loss function f :W×Z → R.Given
a hypothesis w ∈ W and a training sample (xi, yi) ∈ S,
we have a loss f(w, (xi, yi)). SGD [13] is a commonly used
optimization algorithm, which aims to minimize the empirical
risk F (w) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(w, (xi, yi)) over the training data set
S of n samples. For simplicity, let fi(w) = f(w, (xi, yi)) for
fixed S. In each iteration, given a training sample (xt, yt),
SGD updates the hypothesis wt as follows:
wt+1 = Gft,ηt = wt − ηt∇ft(wt), (1)
in which ηt is the learning rate and ∇ft(wt) =
∇f(wt, (xt, yt)) is the gradient.
To facilitate later discussion on convergence, some defini-
tions related to the loss function are presented as follows.
Definition 1. Let g :W → R be a function:
• g is convex if for any u, v ∈ W ,
g(u) ≥ g(v)+ < ∇g(v), u− v >
1We note that the proposed algorithms indeed introduce some communica-
tion overhead. However, it can also be implemented with a parameter server
which maintains and updates the local models for the workers. In this case,
the communication overhead is similar to the existing methods in the literature
mentioned above. Nonetheless, it may be vulnerable to SPOF.
• g is L-Lipschitz if for any u, v ∈ W ,
||g(u)− g(v)|| ≤ L||u− v||
• g is λ− strongly convex if for any u, v ∈ W ,
g(u) ≥ g(v)+ < ∇g(v), u− v > +λ2 ||u− v||2
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, a network N = {1, · · · , N} consisting of N
collaborative workers, each storing a portion of a dataset,
is considered. It is assumed that each worker i stores and
updates its own local model parameter wit which will be used
for their own classification tasks. In addition, asynchronous
update is assumed in this work, where each worker can start its
next update step immediately once the previous step finishes.
Particularly, as is frequently done in the literature (e.g., [14],
[15]), the time steps are modeled as the ticking of local clocks
governed by Poisson processes. It is assumed that each worker
has a clock that ticks with a rate 1 Poisson process. Thus,
the inter-tick times at each worker are rate 1 exponentials,
independent across workers and over time. In addition, there
is a master clock which ticks whenever a local processor clock
ticks and the time is discretized according to the master clock
ticks (since these are the only time that the local models are
updated). In this sense, the master clock ticks according to
a rate N Poisson process and the local clock i that causes
each master clock tick is an independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variable drawn from N . At iteration
step t (when there have been t−1 total update steps for all the
workers), a worker i sends requests and fetches the local model
parameters from all the other workers (i.e., wjt , ∀j ∈ N/{i})
and updates its local models based on the shared model
parameters and its local dataset. In this work, it is assumed that
up to p workers are Byzantine which behave arbitrarily and
can share any information. Furthermore, the Byzantine workers
are assumed to be aware of the local model parameters from
the honest workers since they can also send requests to them.
Let B and H denote the sets of Byzantine workers and honest
workers, respectively. After fetching, worker i will receive
wjt =
{
wjt , if j ∈ H,
any w ∈ W , if j ∈ B.
(2)
The goal of this work is to design robust SGD algorithms
that can tolerant any number of Byzantine attackers (i.e., p can
be any integer in [0, N − 1]).
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
In this section, the proposed algorithms are presented. In
particular, depending on whether the upper bound p of the
number of Byzantine workers is known or not, two scenarios
are considered. It is assumed that whenever a worker responds
to a request and sends its model parameter to others, the shared
information will arrive on time. In this case, all the Byzantine
workers will choose to share something upon requests, since
they can be easily identified if the others fail to receive
information from them.
A. Scenario 1: p is known
The main steps of the proposed algorithm are given in Al-
gorithm 1. The main idea is that the local model parameter
stored by worker i (i.e., wit) can serve as the ground truth,
based on which the received shared model parameters (i.e.,
wjt , ∀j ∈ N/{i}) can be filtered. Specifically, given the upper
bound p of the number of Byzantine workers, accepting the
N − p − 1 model parameters which are closest to an honest
worker’s own model parameter will intuitively help filter out
the wrong information shared by the Byzantine workers.
Algorithm 1 Byzantine Tolerant SGD Algorithm when p is
known
1. Initialization: total number of workers: N , number of
training data samples for each node: M , upper-bound of
the number of Byzantine workers: p, each honest worker
i ∈ H randomly initialize its model parameter wi0.
2. for iteration t = 0, 1, · · · , T do
3. if worker i causes the master clock to tick:
4. worker i sends requests and fetches the model
parameters from all the other workers, then it accepts the
N−p−1model parameters which are closest to its own (i.e.,
the N−p−1 wjt with the smallest ||wit−wjt ||). Then worker
i takes an average over the accepted model parameters, and
randomly samples a mini-batch of training samples Sit from
its local dataset and performs one gradient descent step as
follows:
wi
t+ 1
2
=
wit +
∑
j∈Ai
t
wjt
N − p , (3)
wit+1 = w
i
t+ 1
2
− ηt∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
), (4)
in which wi
t+ 1
2
is the average of its own and the accepted
model parameters for worker i, Ait is the set of accepted
workers, ∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
) = 1
|Si
t
|
∑
m∈Si
t
∇fm(wit+ 1
2
) is the
average gradient and ηt is the learning rate at time t.
5. worker i normalizes its own model parameter, i.e.,
wit+1 =
wit+1
||wit+1||
(5)
6. end if
7.end for
Note that since each worker i compares the received infor-
mation with its own local model parameter by measuring the
distance between the model parameters, naturally one possible
attack against the proposed mechanism for the Byzantine
workers is to add some random noise to the model parameter
(i.e., wit) of the worker that sends the request and then send
the resulting perturbed result back to the requester. Note that
in order to pass the accepting condition in Algorithm 1 (i.e.,
step 4), the Byzantine workers tend to modify the requester’s
model parameter moderately (otherwise it will be filtered out).
Therefore, in the following analysis on Algorithm 1, it is
assumed that for any wjt from worker j accepted by worker
i at time t, it satisfies wjt = w
i
t + ǫ, with E[||ǫ||] = 0
and E[||ǫ||2] ≤ σ2, in which σ is a positive real number.
Nonetheless, we note that the proposed algorithm works well
on other types of attacks too.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the loss function f is λ-strongly
convex. At each iteration t, assume that worker i can sample a
random gradient∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
) that satisfies E[∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
)] =
E[∇F (wi
t+ 1
2
)] and ||∇fSi
t
(w)||2 ≤ G2 for any w and Sit . Then
running Algorithm 1 with the time model as described, with a
constant step size η, we have
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||2] ≤ (1−
2ηλ
N − p )
t
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wl0 − w∗||2]
+
(1− 2ηλ)σ2 + η2G2
2ηλ
.
(6)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first N−
p workers are honest while the last p workers are Byzantine.
Then we have
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||2] =
N − p− 1
N − p
[N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt − w∗||2]
]
+
1
N − p
N−p∑
l=1
[
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]].
(7)
For any l ∈ H, we have
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]
= E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2] + η2E[||∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)||2]
− 2ηE[< wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗,∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
) >].
(8)
According to the strongly convexity of the loss function,
E[< wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗,∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
) >]
= E[< wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗,∇F (wl
t+ 1
2
) >] ≥ λE[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2].
(9)
As a result,
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]
≤ (1− 2ηλ)E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2] + η2E[||∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)||2].
(10)
Note that wl
t+ 1
2
=
wl
t
+
∑
m∈Al
t
wm
t
N−p , we have
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2] ≤ 1
N − p
[
E[||wlt − w∗||2]
+
∑
m∈Al
t
E[||wmt − w∗||2]
] ≤ E[||wlt − w∗||2] + N − p− 1N − p σ2.
(11)
Plugging (10) and (11) into (15), we obtain
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||2] ≤
N − p− 1
N − p
[N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt − w∗||2]
]
+
1
N − p
N−p∑
l=1
[
(1− 2ηλ)E[||wlt − w∗||2]
+
(1− 2ηλ)(N − p− 1)
N − p σ
2 + η2G2
]
≤
N−p∑
l=1
(1− 2ηλ
N − p )E[||w
l
t − w∗||2] +
η2G2
N − p
+
(1− 2ηλ)
(N − p) σ
2.
(12)
Therefore,
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||2] ≤ (1−
2ηλ
N − p)
t
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wl0 − w∗||2]
+
(1− 2ηλ)σ2 + η2G2
2ηλ
.
(13)
Remark 1. Theorem 1 indicates that the local model param-
eters converge to a ball around the optimal solution, whose
radius is upper bounded by a variable depending on the noise
added to the shared model parameters from the Byzantine
workers.
B. Scenario 2: p is unknown
Note that in practice, the upper bound of the number of Byzan-
tine workers may not be available for the honest workers, an
algorithm that does not require any prior knowledge about p is
developed in this subsection. The main steps of the proposed
algorithm are given in Algorithm 2. The main difference with
Algorithm 1 is the conditions of accepting a shared model
parameter. In this case, the filtering criteria in Algorithm 1
cannot be used since p in unknown. Therefore, (24) is proposed
to prevent the workers from accepting model parameters that
are too far away from their local model parameters. However,
the performance induced by condition (24) depends on the
threshold parameter δ. If δ is too large, condition (24) cannot
filter out the Byzantine workers when the total number of
iterations is limited. If δ is too small, all the legit workers
may be filtered, which renders the collaboration ineffective.
With such consideration, condition (25) is proposed to further
improve the performance of Algorithm 2, especially for large
δ. In particular, (25) indicates that if worker i performs a
stochastic gradient update based on the shared model parame-
ter wjt from worker j, its own local parameter model w
i
t is not
in the direction of this update and therefore wjt is supposed to
be closer to the optimal w∗. In addition, (25) is the sufficient
condition for
∑
k∈Si
t
[fk(w
i
t) − fk(wjt )] ≥ 0 when the loss
function f is convex, which essentially means that the model
parameter shared by worker j is likely to be better than the
local one.
The convergence of Algorithm 2 is given as follows.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the loss function f is λ-strongly
convex with L-Lipschitz gradients. At each iteration t, assume
that worker i can sample a random gradient ∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
)
that satisfies E[∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
)] = E[∇F (wi
t+ 1
2
)]. Then running
Algorithm 2 with the time model as described, with a constant
step size 0 ≤ η ≤ 2
λ+L , we have
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||]
≤ (1− ηλL
(N − p)(λ+ L) )
t
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wl0 − w∗||]
+ (1− ηλL
λ+ L
)
δ
(N − p)
t∑
k=0
(1 − ηλL(N−p)(λ+L))(t−k)
k + 1
.
(14)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first N−
p workers are honest while the last p workers are Byzantine.
Then, we have
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||] =
N − p− 1
N − p
[N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt − w∗||]
]
+
1
N − p
N−p∑
l=1
[
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||]].
(15)
For any l ∈ H, we have
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]
= E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2] + η2E[||∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)||2]
− 2ηE[< wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗,∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
) >].
(16)
According to the strongly convexity of the loss function,
E[< wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗,∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
) >]
≥ λL
λ+ L
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2] + 1
λ+ L
||∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)||2.
(17)
As a result,
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]
≤ (1− 2ηλL
λ+ L
)E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2]
+ (η2 − 2η
λ+ L
)E[||∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)||2].
(18)
Note that when η ≤ 2
λ+L , the second term in (18) is negative
and therefore,
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||2]
≤ (1 − 2ηλL
λ+ L
)E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||2].
(19)
Since
√
1− 2x ≤ 1− x when 1− 2x > 0, we have
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− η∇fSl
t
(wl
t+ 1
2
)− w∗||]
≤ (1 − ηλL
λ+ L
)E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||].
(20)
In addition, according to (24),
E[||wl
t+ 1
2
− w∗||]
= E[||
wlt +
∑
m∈Al
t
wmt
|Alt|+ 1
− w∗||]
≤ 1|Alt|+ 1
[
E[||wlt − w∗||] +
∑
m∈Al
t
E[||wmt − w∗||]
]
≤ E[||wlt − w∗||] +
δ
t+ 1
.
(21)
Then,
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||]
≤
N−p∑
l=1
(1− ηλL
(N − p)(λ + L))E[||w
l
t − w∗||]
+ (1 − ηλL
λ+ L
)
δ
(N − p)(t+ 1) .
(22)
As a result,
N−p∑
l=1
E[||wlt+1 − w∗||]
≤
N−p∑
l=1
(1− ηλL
(N − p)(λ+ L) )
t
E[||wl0 − w∗||]
+ (1− ηλL
λ+ L
)
δ
(N − p)
t∑
k=0
(1− ηλL(N−p)(λ+L))(t−k)
k + 1
.
(23)
Remark 2. According to (14), the convergence of the local
model parameters of the honest workers is immediate. In
particular, the term induced by the bound given in (24)
decreases as the number of iterations increases and will finally
vanish to 0. In addition, we note that although condition (24)
can guarantee the convergence of Algorithm 2, an appropriate
δ should be determined for good performance. However, the
choice of δ may depend on not only the specific dataset, but
also the number of workers, which makes it hard to find a
suitable δ in practice. This problem is solved by condition
(25), which preserves good performance even when we set δ
arbitrarily large.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. In particular, the
real public dataset MNIST [16] is used. MNIST is a widely
used computer vision dataset which consists of 70,000 28×28
Algorithm 2 Byzantine Tolerant SGD Algorithm when p is
unknown
1. Initialization: total number of workers: N , number of
training data samples for each node: M , upper bound of
the number of Byzantine workers: p, each honest worker
randomly initialize their model parameters wit’s.
2. for iteration t = 0, 1, · · · , T do
3. if worker i causes the master clock to tick:
4. worker i sends requests and fetches the model
parameters from all the other workers, and then accepts wjt
if it satisfies the following conditions:
||wit − wjt || ≤
δ
t+ 1
, and (24)
< ∇fSi
t
(wjt ), w
i
t − wjt >≥ 0, (25)
in which ∇fSi
t
(wjt ) =
1
|Si
t
|
∑
m∈Si
t
∇fm(wjt ) is the average
gradient corresponding to the shared model parameter wjt
and δ is subject to design and will be discussed in Section
V.
5. Then worker i takes an average over the accepted model
parameters, randomly samples a mini-batch of training
samples Sit from its local dataset and performs one gradient
descent step as follows:
wi
t+ 1
2
=
wit +
∑
j∈Ai
t
wjt
|Ait|+ 1
, (26)
wit+1 = w
i
t+ 1
2
− ηt∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
), (27)
in which Ait is the set of accepted workers, ∇fSi
t
(wi
t+ 1
2
) =
1
|Si
t
|
∑
m∈Si
t
∇fm(wit+ 1
2
) is the average gradient and ηt is
the learning rate at time t.
5. worker i normalizes its own model parameter, i.e.,
wit+1 =
wit+1
||wit+1||
. (28)
6. end if
7.end for
pixel images of handwritten digits from 0 to 9. The dataset
is divided into a training subset of size 60,000 and a testing
subset of size 10,000. It is assumed that there are 50 workers in
total (i.e., N=50) and all of them randomly select M training
samples from the training dataset and test their local model
parameters using the testing subset after training. It is assumed
that every worker builds a softmax regression model locally
and runs one epoch (and therefore a larger local dataset results
in more training iterations). During the training process, the
local clocks of the workers are governed by the asynchronous
model discussed in Section III. In addition, we assumed that
the Byzantine workers train their own local model parameters
independently and send requests to others but never use the
information from others when they perform gradient descent
steps.
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Fig. 6: The performance against “Random” attack
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms,
the average accuracy of the final local model parameters of all
the legit workers is examined and compared with three base-
line mechanisms. In the “Non-collaborative” case, the honest
workers independently train their local model parameters and
do not collaborate at all; in the “All honest” case, all the
workers are supposed to be honest; for the baseline “Krum”,
we implement the algorithm proposed in [7]. In addition, three
types of attacks are considered. In the “Add noise” attack, the
Byzantine attackers add a random Gaussian noise with zero
mean and a variance of 0.1 to the local model parameters of
the workers that send requests; in the “Random” attack, the
Byzantine attackers generate and share a random vector with
each element drawn from a uniform distribution in [0,1]; in
the “Inverse” attack, the Byzantine attackers share the opposite
value of their own local model parameters.
A. The Performance of the Proposed Algorithms against Dif-
ferent Attacks
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed algorithms
against different attacks is examined. In particular, in the “All
honest” case, it is assumed that the total number of honest
workers is the same as the other examined mechanisms (i.e.,
if p = 5, then there are N − p = 45 workers). For the
implementation of Algorithm 2, we present the results ignoring
(24) and the choice of δ will be discussed in Section V-C.
It can be observed from Figs. 1-3 that both Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 perform better than the “Non-collaborative”
case and the “Krum” counterpart against the ”Add noise”
attack. In particular, “Krum” performs even worse than the
“Non-collaborative” case since it only utilizes one of the
gradients shared by all the workers and therefore discards
useful information from most of the legit workers. In addition,
for Algorithm 1, it is assumed that the exact number of
Byzantine workers is known, and therefore it achieves almost
the same performance as that in the “All honest” counterpart,
which can be considered as the optimal case. When p is
small, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show that Algorithm 2 is about 2%
worse than Algorithm 1 in terms of testing accuracy. This
is because the condition given in (25) may filter out some
useful information from the honest workers. However, when
the number of Byzantine workers is large (i.e., p = 45 in the
simulation), the performance of Algorithm 2 is comparable to
that of Algorithm 1 and the “All honest” counterpart.
Figs. 4-6 and Figs. 7-9 show the performance of the
proposed algorithms against the “Random” attack and the
“Inverse” attack, respectively. It can be observed the proposed
algorithms outperform the “Non-collaborative” and “Krum”
counterparts, which further verifies their effectiveness.
B. The Impact of Knowledge about p on Algorithm 1
Note that in the previous discussion, it is assumed that the
exact number of Byzantine workers is known in the im-
plementation of Algorithm 1. In practice, however, such an
assumption is rarely valid. Fig. 10 shows the performance
of Algorithm 1 under “Random” attack when the estimated
number of Byzantine workers (i.e., the p used in Algorithm 1)
is different from the actual one, in the case that each worker
has 600 training samples. It can be seen that when the actual
number of Byzantine workers exceeds the estimated one, the
performance of Algorithm 1 degrades quickly. On the other
hand, an accurate estimated p can lead to better performance.
For example, Algorithm 1 with an estimated p = 25 performs
better than the estimated p = 45 counterpart when there are
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Fig. 12: The impact of the bound δ on Algorithm
2
less than 25 Byzantine workers. We note that when the number
of local training samples is large enough, assuming a large p
does not degrade the performance much since the workers can
afford to discard useful information from some of the legit
workers. However, an accurate estimate of p can be essential
when the workers have only a limited number of training
samples.
C. The Impact of Different Bound δ on Algorithm 2
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show the performance of Algorithm 2
under “Random” attack with different bound δ, in the case
that there are 25 and 45 Byzantine attackers respectively. In
particular, N is the total number of workers and R satisfies
||w|| ≤ R, ∀w ∈ W . It can be seen that a smaller bound may
lead to worse performance since more useful information may
be filtered out. In fact, the optimal choice of δ may depend
on the specific datasets, attacks and the number of Byzantine
workers and it can be computationally expensive to obtain.
However, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show that if we remove the bound
δ (or equivalently set δ to arbitrarily large), the performance
of Algorithm 2 is only around 2% worse than the “All honest”
case.2
VI. RELATED WORKS
There have been many prior works on Byzantine tolerant
SGD algorithms. In particular, [6] proposes a geometric me-
dian based aggregation rule to calculate the gradient used
for parameter update, given all the gradients received from
the workers. In [7], given the total number of workers N
and the number of Byzantine workers p, for each worker
2Similar results can be observed for other scenarios and are omitted in the
interest of space.
i and its gradient ∇f i, the parameter server first selects
a set Vi that contains the N − p − 2 closest gradients
to ∇f i. Then a score si is computed for each worker i,
which measures how close its gradient is to the gradients
in Vi (i.e., si =
∑
j∈Vi
||∇f i − ∇f j||2). Finally, the worker
with the minimum score is selected and its gradient is used
for parameter update. [8] considers generalized Byzantine
attackers which attack certain elements of the gradient vectors
instead of the whole gradient vectors and proposes modified
median based aggregation rules. [9] proposes coordinate-wise
median and coordinate-wise trimmed mean based aggregation
rules for gradient selection. [10] tries to identify the good
workers by comparing their shared gradients with the medians
and use the gradient information from the good workers for
parameter update. However, the algorithms proposed in [6]–
[10] become incompetent when more than half of the workers
are Byzantine. In addition, synchronous settings are assumed
(i.e., the workers with better computation capability have to
wait for the other slower workers) in these works, which
leads to waste of computation resources. [11] proposes an
asynchronous Byzantine tolerant SGD algorithm. Particularly,
it consists of a Byzantine-resilient filter and a frequency filter
to determine whether a (possibly outdated) gradient should
be accepted or not. However, it can only deal with up to 13
Byzantine workers. In [12], it is assumed that the parameter
server has a small portion of dataset locally, which is used to
compute a noisy version of the true gradient. After receiving
the gradients from the workers, the parameter server compares
them with the local noisy gradients and decides to accept
them if the difference is within a threshold. In this sense, the
algorithm proposed in [12] can deal with an arbitrary number
of Byzantine workers and therefore is the most relevant one
to this work. However, it still requires a parameter server to
collect the gradients and therefore may be vulnerable to the
single point of failure. In addition, it requirs to manually set
the threshold, which depends on specific datasets. Finally, only
synchronous scenarios are considered in [12].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Considering that most of the Byzantine tolerant SGD algo-
rithms in the literature are either synchronous or robust against
a limited number of Byzantine workers, two asynchronous
distributed Byzantine tolerant SGD algorithms that can deal
with an arbitrary number of Byzantine workers are proposed
in this work. The convergence analysis for both algorithms
is provided and the simulation results show that the proposed
algorithms work well against all types of the examined Byzan-
tine attacks. Since the proposed algorithms only consider the
current shared information to decide whether to accept them or
not, considering the usage of past information for performance
improvement remains our future work.
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